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In the preamble of the U.S. Constitution, the People are given extraordinary 
responsibility to secure domestic prosperity for all future generations. Without a 
voice, the People have no power. Voting is the manifestation of the People’s voice, 
spirit, and will, without which our democratic nation would cease to function. 
Unfortunately, the polarized state of political affairs in America threatens to 
undermine the truth of the People’s will. Extensive voting reform is not only 
needed, it is required “to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure 
domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general 
Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity[.]”1 
 
* Assistant Professor and Head of Scholarly Communication, Appalachian State University. 
J.D. University of North Carolina Law School; L.L.M. Duke University Law School; M.Sc. Oxford University. 
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Spuller, Hunter Enoch, the Chamber of Digital Commerce, and Professor Duncan A. Buell, Professor of 
Computer Science and Engineering at University of South Carolina.   
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Blockchain has been cited as one of the most influential trends that will impact 
the future of industry and society.2 In particular, blockchain technology has the 
ability to disrupt industries and processes requiring verification, authentication, and 
signature,3 and is uniquely beneficial for the secure storage and transmission of 
information and transactions.4 Given the number of use cases where blockchain has 
dramatically improved complex, interconnected processes, such as supply chain 
management and financial transactions, the technology lends itself naturally to the 
cause of voting reform.  
Since 2012, the Electoral Integrity Project (EIP) has been gathering 
independent evidence about the quality of elections around the world. An array of 
flaws compromising electoral systems in democratic societies globally are 
described in brief: 
District boundaries are gerrymandered . . . . Independent media are 
muzzled. Citizens are ill-informed about choices . . . . Vote counts are 
fiddled . . . . Electoral registers are out of date . . . . Votes are bought . . 
. . Incompetent local officials run out of ballot papers. Incumbents are 
immune from effective challengers . . . . Women candidates face 
discrimination . . . . Voting machines jam. Lines lengthen . . . . Citizens 
cast more than one ballot. Legal requirements serve to suppress voting 
rights. Polling stations are inaccessible. Software crashes . . . . Courts 
fail to resolve complaints impartially.5   
To understand these issues, Part I presents a case study of North Carolina 
election chicanery, describing major challenges observed during the state’s 
elections over the past decade. Topics discussed include strict voter identification 
requirements, voter fraud, election recounts, and voter roll errors. Part II 
recommends practical blockchain-centric policies designed to restore electoral 
trust and improve basic electoral procedures for all states in the Union. Part III 
concludes that, in the next 10 years, blockchain-enabled voting may provoke radical 
changes to the electoral system, including the introduction of “smart” elections and 
the use of “carrot and stick” voting tax policies.  
I. ELECTORAL INTEGRITY CHALLENGES IN NORTH CAROLINA 
Like any democratic ecosystem, North Carolina has faced challenges 
conducting fair and free elections. According to a recently released EIP report, 
North Carolina’s electoral integrity score for the 2016 elections was 58/100, 
positioning the state on the same level as “‘pseudo-democracies’ like Cuba, 
 
2. Amy Webb, 8 Tech Trends to Watch in 2016, HARV. BUS. REV. (Dec. 8, 2015), 
https://hbr.org/2015/12/8-tech-trends-to-watch-in-2016; DON TAPSCOTT & ALEX TAPSCOTT, BLOCKCHAIN 
REVOLUTION: HOW THE TECHNOLOGY BEHIND BITCOIN IS CHANGING MONEY, BUSINESS, AND THE WORLD (2016); 
STEPHEN WILLIAMS, BLOCKCHAIN: THE NEXT EVERYTHING (2019).   
3. Webb, supra note 2.  
4. Svein Ølnes, Jolien Ubacht & Marijn Jansenn, Blockchain in Government: Benefits and 
Implications of Distributed Ledger Technology for Information Sharing, 34 GOV’T INFO. Q. 355, 355 (2017). 
5. PIPPA NORRIS, WHY AMERICAN ELECTIONS ARE FLAWED (AND HOW TO FIX THEM) 2–3 (2017). 





Indonesia, and Sierra Leone.”6 In 2018, North Carolina’s electoral integrity score fell 
seven points further to 46th place in the entire nation.7 Such abysmal numbers have 
led political scientists to assert that North Carolina can no longer be classified as a 
full democracy.8 Yet, numbers, rankings, and scores do not tell the whole story. 
Tensions in North Carolina politics ballooned in 2010 when North Carolina 
Republicans took control of the General Assembly for the first time since 1870 due 
to growing discontent with the Obama administration.9 Republican leadership was 
further consolidated in 2012 when a Republican governor was voted into office, 
giving the GOP veto power and total control over state legislative activity.10 Not 
surprisingly, the dramatic shift in power, which occurred after 140 years of 
continuous Democratic reign, unsettled the status quo. Seizing the opportunity, 
Republicans overhauled long-standing voting procedures, which led to a number of 
politicized court battles and polarized news coverage.11 At the same time, there has 
been no shortage of election scandals. 
A. Voter Fraud Persists Over Time 
Over the last several decades, North Carolina has had a small-scale yet 
consistent showing of voter fraud, which has damaged the public trust in the 
electoral process. In 1986, forty-one individuals were charged with buying votes in 
western North Carolina.12 Between 2003 and 2016, twelve votes were unlawfully 
cast, and three county elections in southeastern North Carolina were overturned.13 
Between 2017 and 2019, at least twenty-one incidents of voter fraud were 
prosecuted.14 Most notably, in 2018, the use of fraudulent absentee ballots actually 
swung a Ninth District Congressional election by a razor-thin margin.15 Discovery of 
the fraud led to criminal charges, a new election, embarrassment for the state of 
North Carolina, and further polarization between political parties.16 
 
6. Andrew Reynolds, North Carolina Is No Longer Classified as a Democracy, NEWS & OBSERVER 
(Dec. 22, 2016, 11:06 PM), https://www.newsobserver.com/opinion/op-ed/article122593759.html. 
7. PIPPA NORRIS, HOLLY ANN GARNETT & MAX GRÖMPING, ELECTORAL INTEGRITY PROJECT, ELECTORAL 
INTEGRITY IN THE 2018 AMERICAN ELECTIONS 7 (2019), https://www.electoralintegrityproject.com/peius2018. 
8. Reynolds, supra note 6.  




12. Election Fraud Cases, HERITAGE FOUND. 
https://www.heritage.org/voterfraud/search?state=NC&combine=&year=&case_type=All&fraud_type
=All&page=0 (last visited May 25, 2020). 
13.   Id. 
14.   Id. The Heritage Foundation’s database of election fraud cases highlights approximately 
twenty-one incidents occurring between 2017 and 2019, including voting by ineligible felons and 
ineligible aliens, voter registration fraud, and duplicate voting. Id.; see also Three NC Residents Arrested 
on Voter Fraud Charges, WBTV (June 12, 2019, 5:24 PM), https://www.wbtv.com/2019/06/12/three-nc-
residents-arrested-voter-fraud-charges/. 
15.   Timeline: North Carolina’s Absentee Ballot Scandal, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Feb. 27, 2019), 
https://apnews.com/7fcfea814fe3479eb5623ce9511b09f0. 
16.   Alan Blinder, In North Carolina, Investigators Find Ballot ‘Scheme’ in House Race, N.Y. TIMES 
(Feb. 18, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/18/us/north-carolina-election-fraud.html.  
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Two major audits by the North Carolina Board of Elections (Board) also 
revealed fraud.17 In 2014, an audit report18 identified 35,750 people who potentially 
double-voted,19 an anomaly which was discovered by the state’s examination of 
voting data stored in Interstate Crosscheck.20 However, critics pointed out that 
Interstate Crosscheck’s database results were flawed,21 and that several double 
votes were a result of clerical error. For example, voters signed poll books 
incorrectly, election clerks scanned the wrong bar codes, and missing data codes 
were not entered properly.22 Despite these errors, the 2014 audit report verified at 
least eighty-one individuals who were deceased before the election, yet who still 
cast a vote.23 
In 2017, a Board audit24 of the 2016 general election revealed 508 ineligible 
votes: 441 by felons, forty-one by non-citizens, twenty-four cases of double voting, 
and two cases of voter impersonation (one by mail and one in-person).25   
B. Voter Rolls Are Rife with Errors 
North Carolina elections are flawed due to voter roll inaccuracy. Notable 
irregularities were found in the Board’s audit of death records from the Department 
of Health and Human Services for the 2012 election: 50,000 death records had not 
been sent to the Board of Elections, and 13,416 deceased voters remained on the 
voter rolls in October 2013.26   
 
17.   See N.C. State Bd. of Elections, Presentation to Joint Legislative Elections Oversight 
Committee (2014) (available at 
https://wwwcache.wral.com/asset/news/state/nccapitol/2014/04/02/13534230/SBOE_JointCommitte
e_April_2014.pdf). 
18.   Id. 
19.   Zachary Roth, Voter Fraud in North Carolina? Not So Fast, MSNBC (Apr. 3, 2014), 
http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/voter-fraud-north-carolina-not-so-fast-0 (last updated Apr. 8, 2014, 
11:45 AM); Russ Feingold, The Crosscheck Voter Database Is a Security Threat, NATION (Feb. 2, 2018), 
https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/the-crosscheck-voter-database-is-a-security-threat/. 
20.   See N.C. STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS, POST-ELECTION AUDIT REPORT (2017), 
https://s3.amazonaws.com/dl.ncsbe.gov/sboe/Post-
Election%20Audit%20Report_2016%20General%20Election/Post-Election_Audit_Report.pdf; see also 
LAUREN HARMON ET AL.,CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS ACTION FUND, THE HEALTH OF STATE DEMOCRACIES 25–26 (2015), 
https://cdn.americanprogressaction.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/HSD-report-FINAL.pdf. The 
Interstate Crosscheck Program was administered by the Kansas Secretary of State. Id. 
21.   Chris Kromm, After Initial Hysteria, Back-Pedaling Over NC Voter Fraud Claims, FACING 
SOUTH (Apr. 11, 2014), https://www.facingsouth.org/2014/04/after-initial-hysteria-back-pedaling-over-
nc-voter.html; Roth, supra note 19.   
22.   Kromm, supra note 21. 
23.   Laura Leslie, State Elections Officials Seek Tighter Security, WRAL (Apr. 2, 2014, 2:06 PM), 
https://www.wral.com/state-elections-officials-seek-tighter-security/13533579/. 
24.   N.C. STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS, supra note 20, at 2. 
25.   Editorial, Now We Finally Know How Bad Voter Fraud is in North Carolina, CHARLOTTE 
OBSERVER (Apr. 24, 2017, 5:52 PM), 
https://www.charlotteobserver.com/opinion/editorials/article146486019.html. 
26.   Susan Myrick, Election Reforms Reveal Vote Fraud, CIVITAS INST. (Apr. 3, 2014), 
https://www.nccivitas.org/2014/elections-reforms-reveal-vote-fraud/. 





Cleaning up voter rolls has garnered bipartisan support;27 however North 
Carolina and other states are wary about how to remove duplicate registrations, 
deceased voters, and voters who have moved out of state without purging 
legitimate voters.28 In Husted v. A. Philip Randolph Institute, the Supreme Court 
weighed in, affirming that states can take reasonable steps to remove voters from 
voter registration polls in order to ensure accuracy and uphold the integrity of the 
electoral process.29   
Unfortunately, identifying voters for removal can involve multiple steps and 
take several years.30 In Columbus, Ohio, for example, removing out-of-state voters 
from the voter roll may take six years: 
First, a voter must fail to partake in “voter activity,” including not just 
casting a ballot but also other actions like signing a petition, for two 
years. Ohio then mails a pre-stamped, pre-addressed notice to the 
voter asking that he confirm he is still a resident of Ohio. If the notice is 
not returned, and the voter fails to cast a ballot in any election over the 
next four years, state officials may then remove the voter on the 
grounds that he is no longer a resident.31  
The removal mechanism is a complex process because of statutory 
requirements, pursuant to the National Voter Registration Act (NVRA), and involve 
written confirmation of a change in residence to a place outside the jurisdiction or 
compliance with notice procedures.32 The NVRA gives states the option to access 
change of address information through the United States Postal Service or devise 
their own programs to identify ineligible voters.33 The lack of uniformity in how 
states initiate the notice process may cause further confusion among citizens who 
move on a frequent basis, such as students and recent graduates.     
C. Voter ID Laws Are Controversial and Politicized  
Debate over voter ID laws in North Carolina has been largely controversial and 
politicized, and has prevented any meaningful voting reform.34 In 2013, the North 
Carolina legislature passed House Bill 589, otherwise known as the Voter 
Information Verification Act, which required voters to present valid, unexpired 
 
27.  Bipartisan Support for Voter Registration Modernization, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Mar. 10, 
2017), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/bipartisan-support-voter-
registration-modernization. 
28.   Roth, supra note 19. 
29.   See generally Husted v. A. Philip Randolph Inst., 138 S. Ct. 1833, 1848 (2018).  
30.   Id. at 1842. 
31.   See generally Hans A. von Spakovsky & Jason Snead, Supreme Court Gives States the Green 
Light to Clean Up Voter Rolls, HERITAGE FOUND. (June 11, 2018), https://www.heritage.org/election-
integrity/commentary/supreme-court-gives-states-the-green-light-clean-voter-rolls. 
32.   See generally id. 
33.   The National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (NVRA), U.S. DEP’T JUST., 
https://www.justice.gov/crt/national-voter-registration-act-1993-nvra. 
34.   See infra notes 38–39, 41–42 and accompanying text. 
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photo identification at polling stations.35 The purpose of the new law was to prevent 
in-person voter fraud.36 Despite similar voter ID laws being enacted around the 
same time in fourteen other states,37 Democrats hailed North Carolina’s version as 
an “abomination”38 and “the country’s worst voter suppression law.”39 The law 
required strict identification requirements (no student IDs), reduced the number of 
days citizens could vote early, eliminated same-day voter registration during early 
voting season, and repealed out-of-precinct voting.40 Critics claimed that the law 
made voting less convenient for minorities, the disabled, and young people.41  
North Carolina’s voter ID law also drew criticism from the Department of 
Justice (DOJ), which sued the State based on the law’s discriminatory effect and 
intent.42 The move by the DOJ was swift, coming directly after the Supreme Court 
invalidated a key part of the 1965 Voting Rights Act that previously required states 
with a history of discrimination to seek pre-approval from federal authorities before 
changing voting laws.43 North Carolina Governor Pat McCrory called the Justice 
Department’s lawsuit an example of “federal overreach that ha[d] no merit.”44        
D. Coordinated Election Fraud Operations Exist in North Carolina  
Coordinated electoral fraud has also plagued North Carolina.45 In 2019, an 
investigation was launched in Bladen County, North Carolina, when the Republican 
victor in the 9th Congressional District election won the race by 905 votes despite 
losing in six out of eight counties.46 The investigation uncovered foul play: at least 
 
35.   Voter Information Verification Act, 2013 N.C. Sess. Laws 381 (repealed 2018), 
https://www.ncleg.net/Sessions/2013/Bills/House/PDF/H589v9.pdf. 
36.   Id. 
37.   Amanda Holpuch, North Carolina Voter ID Law Struck Down as ‘Discriminatory’ by Federal 
Court, GUARDIAN (July 29, 2016, 2:44 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/jul/29/north-
carolina-voter-id-law-struck-down. 
38.   Matthew Burns, Laura Leslie & Mark Binker, Voting Changes Head to Governor, WRAL.COM, 
https://www.wral.com/voting-changes-head-to-governor/12703982/ (last updated July 26, 2013, 6:11 
AM).  
39.   Ari Berman, North Carolina Passes the Country’s Worst Voter Suppression Law, NATION (July 
26, 2013), https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/north-carolina-passes-countrys-worst-voter-
suppression-law/. 
40.   Id. 
41.   Id. 
42.   Evan Perez, Justice Department Sues North Carolina Over Voting Law, CNN, 
https://www.cnn.com/2013/09/30/us/north-carolina-voting-lawsuit/index.html (last updated Sept. 30, 
2013). Eric Holder criticized the Supreme Court’s decision to overturn unconstitutional provisions of the 
Voting Rights Act and stated at a Congressional Black Caucus Foundation that the Justice Department 
would find ways to accomplish the goals of the section that were struck down. Id. The North Carolina 
State Conference of the NAACP and League of Women Voters also filed lawsuits against the state. See 
North Carolina NAACP v. McCrory, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (May 15, 2017), 
https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/court-cases/north-carolina-naacp-v-mccrory. 
43.   See Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013). 
44.   Carrie Johnson, Justice Department Sues North Carolina Over Voter ID Law, NPR, (Sept. 30, 
2013, 3:02 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2013/09/30/227591062/justice-
department-to-sue-north-carolina-over-voter-id-law. 
45.   See infra notes 46–51 and accompanying text. 
46.   Doug Bock Clark, The Tearful Drama of North Carolina’s Election-Fraud Hearings, NEW 
YORKER (Feb. 24, 2019), https://www.newyorker.com/news/dispatch/the-tearful-drama-of-north-
carolinas-election-fraud-hearings. 





1000 mail-in votes were fraudulent.47 Felony charges were eventually filed against 
a Republican political operative who tampered with and unlawfully submitted 
ballots without voters’ knowledge.48 Time magazine called the incident a “black 
mark on American democracy, a clear-cut case of electoral malfeasance that should 
have been caught much earlier in the process.”49 Notably, Bladen County has been 
under investigation five times since 2010 for the exploitative use of absentee ballots 
by both Democrats and Republicans.50 Three elections in neighboring Robeson 
County have also been re-held due to fraud allegations and government 
corruption.51  
E. Vote Recounts Undermine Confidence in Election Results 
Vote recounts undermine public confidence in elections, as evidenced by the 
2000 Florida presidential race.52 Vote recounts in North Carolina’s gubernatorial 
elections are also drawing close scrutiny. In 2016, sitting North Carolina Governor 
Pat McCrory petitioned for a partial recount of voting machine results in Durham 
County, even though the local board of elections determined that a recount was 
unnecessary.53 While Democratic gubernatorial opponent Roy Cooper led the race 
by 10,000 votes, McCrory’s campaign claimed that several precincts in Durham 
County had encountered technical problems and possible computer glitches.54  
North Carolina law gives candidates the right to request or demand a recount in 
various situations, such as close-vote-margins.55     
The Civitas Institute also questioned the number of votes cast in the 2016 
McCrory-Cooper gubernatorial election, claiming that same-day registration votes 
had been unlawfully counted because those votes were still pending verification.56 
The NAACP protested too, filing a lawsuit and alleging that the 1,500 provisional 
votes were not properly counted because the state DMV had failed to pass along 
 
47.   Id. 
48.   Richard Gonzales, North Carolina GOP Operative Faces New Felony Charges that Allege 
Ballot Fraud, NPR (July 30, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/07/30/746800630/north-carolina-gop-
operative-faces-new-felony-charges-that-allege-ballot-fraud. 
49.  Philip Elliott, Why North Carolina’s Election Fraud Hurts American Democracy, TIME (Feb. 
22, 2019), https://time.com/5535292/north-carolina-election-fraud/. 
50.  Bruce Henderson & Will Doran, In 2 NC Counties with ‘Rough Politics,’ Election Fraud 
Claims are Nothing New, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER (Dec. 7, 2018, 4:29 PM), 
https://www.charlotteobserver.com/news/politics-government/election/article222739860.html. 
51.  Id. 
52.  Ron Elving, The Florida Recount of 2000: A Nightmare that Goes on Haunting, NPR (Nov. 
12, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/11/12/666812854/the-florida-recount-of-2000-a-nightmare-
that-goes-on-haunting. 
53.  Emily Cadei, North Carolina Governor’s Race Recount: Last Gasp of a Changing South?, 
NEWSWEEK (Dec. 3, 2016), https://www.newsweek.com/north-carolina-governor-recount-changing-
south-527911. Governor McCrory eventually asked for a full recount, pursuant to his right under N.C. 
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 163-182.7 (West  2019). Id. 
54.  Id.  
55.   N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163-182.7 
56.   Complaint at 1–2, De Luca v. N.C. Bd. of Elections, No. 16-913 (E.D.N.C. Nov. 21, 2016). 
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voter registration data to the Board before the election.57 Although same-day 
registrations have a higher risk of being fraudulent,58 the 1,500 provisional votes 
were still ultimately counted.59   
Election audits are critical to maintaining free and fair elections, and state law 
ensures that recounts can happen in close elections. However, the persistent 
questioning of whether vote counts are valid that occurs in the media and in court 
rooms undermines the public’s confidence in electoral management and 
procedures.60   
II. BLOCKCHAIN VOTING SYSTEMS RESOLVE FLAWS IN BASIC ELECTORAL 
PROCEDURES  
Blockchain technology should not be viewed as a panacea for every flaw 
responsible for injury to electoral integrity in North Carolina or broader U.S. 
elections. Equally, the technology should not be dismissed in perfunctory fashion 
as an inadequate replacement for tried and true voting procedures, such as hand-
counting paper ballots by part-time poll workers. In fact, advancements in 
blockchain technology made in the next 10 years will lead to achievable and much-
needed reform in U.S. voting policy. 
Two hypothesized outcomes of widespread adoption of blockchain 
technology in voting systems include: (1) the alleviation of partisan polarization 
over basic electoral procedures and (2) the restoration of public trust through fraud 
prevention. Blockchain technology already has the mechanisms to solve basic flaws 
in America’s electoral system. Technological advancements will continue to lead to 
improved security, voting privacy standards, and operational efficiencies. 
A. Improving Electoral Management with a Tiered Blockchain Ecosystem  
Voting reform begins with the adoption of professional standards in state and 
local elections. Article 1, Section 4 of the Constitution grants authority to state 
legislatures to regulate the time, place, and manner of elections, meaning that 
different states have different arrangements for basic procedures, such as verifying 
registration and identification.61 To complicate matters, different counties also 
come up with different rules for managing local elections, such as local hours and 
where to place ballot information.  Developing a tiered blockchain voting ecosystem 
that channels information between county-level and state-level blockchain systems 
would foster electoral integrity and streamline electoral management in state and 
local government. 
 
57.   David A. Graham, What’s Really Going On in North Carolina’s Gubernatorial Race?, 
ATLANTIC (Nov. 23, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/11/whats-really-going-
on-in-north-carolinas-gubernatorial-race/508520/. 
58.   At least 2% of same-day registration votes are fraudulent. Id. 
59.   Id. 
60.   Pippa Norris, Do Perceptions of Electoral Malpractice Undermine Democratic Satisfaction? 
The US in Comparative Perspective, 40 INT’L POL. SCI. REV. 5 (2018). Lack of confidence in elections paves 
the way for the erosion of democracy. 
61.   U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1. 





Characteristics of blockchain technology central to electoral management 
reform include transparency and immutability of stored data.62 These 
characteristics are intrinsic to the technology due to blockchain’s ability to securely 
store data and transactions on a distributed network of nodes, or computers.63 In 
essence, all nodes share the same data and the same blockchain ledger.64 New 
information can be added to the ledger only when all nodes agree, or reach 
consensus, that the data has been verified as uniform across all interconnected 
ledgers.65 In doing so, a decentralized blockchain network automatically 
authenticates new information without having to rely on a central actor, such as a 
government agency or poll volunteer.66 Old information is also never removed, 
thereby creating a transaction history that is fully auditable.67  
B. Restore Public Confidence in Elections During a Pandemic with Blockchain 
Voting Systems  
In the United States, blockchain voting apps68 exist, but are not being used on 
an extensive scale. So far, voting pilots have been successfully conducted in 
elections in West Virginia, Utah, Colorado, and Oregon.69   
Critics of blockchain voting apps comment that the technology is susceptible 
to hacking and other security vulnerabilities.70 These criticisms are reasonable as 
the technology is still emerging, and continued investment in its development is of 
critical importance. However, the unexpected arrival of the COVID-19 pandemic 
prior to the 2020 U.S. presidential election has forced the country and critics to 
seriously consider how blockchain will shape the future of voting.  
The federal government is also taking notice. Now that many Americans will 
have to mail in votes during the pandemic, the US Postal Service filed a patent for 
a blockchain-based voting system. The patent explains that registered voters will 
 
62.   Nathan Reiff, Blockchain Explained, INVESTOPEDIA (Feb. 1, 2020), 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/b/blockchain.asp.  
63.   Id. 
64.   Id. 
65.   Id. 
66.   Id. 
67.   Id.; cf. Jacob Hoffman-Andrews, E-Voting Machines Need Paper Audits to be Trustworthy, 
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Nov. 23, 2016), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2016/11/e-voting-machines-
need-paper-audits-be-trustworthy.  
68.   See e.g. VOATZ, https://voatz.com (last visited May 25, 2020). 
69.   Tusk Philanthropies, Mobile Voting is coming to local Oregon elections, PRNEWSWIRE (Oct. 
16, 2019), https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/mobile-voting-is-coming-to-local-oregon-
elections-300939320.html; Makena Kelly, Nearly 150 West Virginians voted with a mobile blockchain 
app, THE VERGE (Nov. 10, 2018, 2:00 PM), 
https://www.theverge.com/2018/11/10/18080518/blockchain-voting-mobile-app-west-virginia-voatz; 
Daniel Palmer, Utah County to Offer Blockchain Voting App in Municipal Elections, COINDESK (July 23, 
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receive a “computer readable code in the mail [that] confirms identity and confirms 
correct ballot information … [,] separates voter identification and votes to ensure 
voter anonymity, and stores votes on a distributed ledger in a blockchain.”71  
Providing a secure way to cast a vote remotely could encourage voting 
participation by citizens who either distrust the mail-in voting system or who are at 
high risk of becoming seriously ill from the COVID-19 virus when visiting a polling 
station. Although the patent filing may be too late for the 2020 presidential 
election, the stage has been set for future adoption of blockchain technology in U.S. 
elections.                 
C. Verifying Voting Eligibility on the Blockchain 
Using a blockchain voting system, voting eligibility could be authenticated 
instantly by checking encrypted data blocks that are stored on state agency nodes 
at the DMV, the Secretary of the State, the Board of Elections, or state divisions 
where vital records are kept. Data, such as birth and death certificates, signatures, 
criminal records, social security numbers, and postal addresses, could be 
automatically accessed and authenticated during the registration process. Many 
state DMV systems already link to state voter registration databases;72 however 
transmitting these verification checks over a blockchain-based system would leave 
forensic evidence, such as whether transactions occurred correctly over multiple 
network access points. Large corporations that perform KYC/AML checks already 
conduct similar types of verification due diligence.73   
Using automatic enforcement of smart contracts74 based on fraud-prevention 
criteria, a blockchain voting system could quickly identify double voting attempts, 
duplicate registrations, dead voters, and ineligible voters (due to age, citizenship, 
felon status, or residence). In instances of fraud, access would be denied to ballots, 
digital or otherwise. Same-day registrants could also benefit from an immediate 
verification process. Likewise, instantaneous verification could limit the use of 
provisional ballots, reduce long wait times in polling lines, and increase voter 
turnout.75  
In practice, state agencies would have to maintain an accessible, current, and 
encrypted database of records, such as felon status, birthdates, and death 
certificates, in order for verifications to be credible. For example, court and prison 
data for felons recently released on probation or parole would need to be updated 
regularly in order for voting eligibility to be processed accurately and timely. 
For states that do not require voter identification, voters could have the 
option to electronically sign time-stamped digital affidavits or submit digital 
signatures with unique PIN codes or cryptographic hash functions (digital 
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https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/same-day-registration.aspx. 





fingerprints).76 All data submissions and password access attempts would be 
automatically recorded on the blockchain, providing increased transparency and 
auditability.77 
D. Verifying Voting Registration on the Blockchain  
All voters, automatic registrants, and same-day registrants, could receive 
digital ballots upon verification.78 Electronic transmission of these ballots could be 
encrypted for enhanced privacy to ensure anonymity of votes.79 Ballots could also 
be automatically recorded on the blockchain for auditability if a recount dispute or 
fraud claim arises.80 Voting registrations that are denied could be challenged 
through a smart contract dispute resolution process.81 Encrypted digital ballots 
could be stored in a secure online portal and accessed by computer or mobile 
phone.82 
On a blockchain voting system, cleaning voter rolls could happen 
automatically by ensuring that a voter’s jurisdictional data reaches consensus with 
data hosted in other states’ databases.83 Currently, thirty states already have access 
to voter registration data, a privilege given to members of the Electronic 
Registration Information Center (ERIC).84 Placing databases on a blockchain 
protocol would ensure the accuracy of the data and prevent manipulation.85 Voters 
could also confirm or deny jurisdiction changes electronically during the voter 
eligibility verification process, pending amendment to Section 8(d) of the National 
Voter Registration Act.86 The result of these proposed technological changes could 
lead to reduced administrative costs and fewer inefficiencies. 
E. Decentralization Mitigates Risk of Voting System Malicious Attacks and Data 
Manipulation 
Another key characteristic of blockchain technology is decentralization.  When 
information is stored across a distribution of nodes (decentralization), hackers have 
a more difficult time penetrating a multi-pronged distribution network compared 
 
76.   See Cryptographic Hash, SCIENCEDIRECT, https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/computer-
science/cryptographic-hash (last visited May 25, 2020). 
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to focusing a malicious attack on a central control point.87 As a result, the risk of 
system failure is significantly mitigated.88 Decentralization also eliminates the need 
for reliance on a central actor that has complete governing authority.89 Doing so 
reduces the risk of data manipulation by a single authority.90 
Using a blockchain voting system, bad actors could not alter data blocks 
containing individual votes or records of official voting tallies without leaving the 
footprint of a malicious attempt on the blockchain.91 Because all additions or 
deletions to data are recorded, the immutability of the data would restore integrity 
and public trust in the electoral process.92  
Electoral administration by states and counties is already decentralized in 
nature, which has been useful in hindering hackers.93 Encouraging states to 
overhaul currently-existing electronic voting machines and replace them with 
county-level blockchains that feed into a state-level blockchain ecosystem will 
provide additional layers of protection through cryptographic security measures, 
architectural decentralization, political decentralization, and logical 
decentralization.94     
Significantly, the principles of state sovereignty over election matters, 
underpinned by Article 1 and Article 2 of the Constitution and bolstered by the 
architectural framework of federalism, organically lay a legal foundation for a 
democratic marketplace of decentralized voting establishments. 
F. Blockchain Voting Alleviates Partisan Polarization Over Basic Electoral 
Procedures 
The outcomes generated by a blockchain voting system alleviates most 
partisan concerns regarding basic electoral procedures. For example, completing 
voter verification on the blockchain would meet strict voting identification 
requirements (favored by Republicans). At the same time, citizens without formal 
identification cards can overcome voter verification barriers in flexible, alternative 
ways (favored by Democrats) through the blockchain ecosystem’s ability to verify 
other unique identifying personal data located within a state’s database or, 
alternatively, by giving voters the option to submit digitally encrypted affidavits that 
attest to their identity.95 
The integrity of voting registration would be strengthened by providing 
automated and up-to-date cleanup of voter rolls, thereby denying registration 
access to duplicate registrants, potential double voters, dead voters, felons, and so 
on (favored by Republicans).96 Ensuring the integrity and accuracy of the data 
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through the use of immutable cryptographic hash values would also reduce the 
elimination of legitimate voters and false positives (favored by Democrats).97 Early 
voters and same day registrants would benefit from immediate verification, 
thereby legitimizing votes and providing access to “young, itinerant, and minority 
voters” (favored by Democrats).98 Immediate verification would reduce long lines 
at the polls and increase confidence in final vote counts (favored by both parties).99 
Votes would also be tamper-proof, as any attempts to change data would be 
recorded and auditable (favored by both parties).100 
G. Blockchain Voting Increases Access and Improves Voter Turnout  
Using a blockchain voting system could minimize logistical barriers to vote. In 
an ideal world, citizens could access the voting system on a technical device, such 
as a computer or mobile phone.101 Research shows that 96% of the American public 
own a cellphone of some kind, and 81% own a smartphone.102 Smartphone 
ownership also transcends race: 82% of White adults own smartphones; 80% of 
Black adults own smartphones; and 79% of Hispanics own smartphones.103 
However, lower income and rural Americans are more likely to be disenfranchised; 
71% of Americans earning less than $30,000 own smartphones; and 71% of rural 
Americans own smartphones.104 To mitigate factors such as income and 
geographical location, local blockchain voting mechanisms can be implemented for 
public use in places like public libraries, courthouses, or high schools. 
The ease of accessing a blockchain voting system with a mobile phone could 
bolster voter participation by reducing the amount of time and effort involved 
compared to traditional means of voting. To illustrate this point, if every 
smartphone owner voted in the next election, the voter turnout rate would trump 
that of every election since 1918.105 Furthermore, disabled citizens, overseas 
compatriots, and deployed military personnel would avoid having to rely on the 
sluggish, unreliable national and international mail systems, and instead, use a 
smartphone application that delivers enhanced security, speed, and convenience. 
A mobile blockchain voting system could also reduce the delays in determining who 
wins on election night as votes would be tallied automatically and accurately. Over 
time, the mobile blockchain application’s user interface and cybersecurity 
architecture will continue to develop alongside broad technological advancement. 
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Voting from a smartphone may also be a critical solution in times of war, 
natural disaster, or public health crises. The COVID-19106 pandemic will be a 
significant test for the 2020 U.S. general election. This public health crisis is already 
serving as a driving catalyst for states and local governments to study and invest in 
mobile, secure, and blockchain-enabled voting systems.107 A nationwide call for 
voting on the blockchain may be closer than America thinks. 
III. CONCLUSION  
In the next 10 years, advancements in blockchain technology may provoke 
radical transformation of voting policies and procedures that align with bipartisan 
priorities. At a minimum, states could start to hold elections digitally, similar to 
Estonia108 and Switzerland,109 and on the blockchain, similar to West Virginia, Utah, 
Oregon, and Colorado.110 
To counteract misinformation, fake news, and deep fake technology, states 
could advocate for the use of “smart” elections conducted on mobile blockchain 
voting systems. Imagine voting on a device that provides interactive information 
about candidates as you vote, including campaign positions, proposed initiatives, 
and formal candidate statements. Advance approval from candidates would ensure 
that information is not mischaracterized. Candidate political positions would be 
secured in an immutable, secure format to foster transparency and enable voters 
to find direct sources of credible facts easily. Informational content would be 
recorded on the blockchain to hold victors accountable for initiatives undertaken 
during their terms.  
Holding “smart” elections would foster civic engagement, lead to a more 
informed voting public, and strengthen confidence in the public vote. Over time, 
the success of “smart” elections could ultimately lead to a more frequent use of 
“smart” referendums, which would further embolden the democratic spirit of the 
United States. 
Controversial voting policies may also be given consideration due to 
blockchain’s innate characteristics of auditability, data accuracy, transaction speed, 
authentication, and decentralization. For example, a “failure to vote” tax or, 
alternatively, a tax credit may be introduced by Congress under the guise of 
advocating for the public purpose of maximum voter participation. A blockchain 
voting system could facilitate the implementation and execution of such a proposal, 
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as tax payments or credits could be easily tracked, tallied, and audited without 
incurring significant administrative costs and complexities. 
Furthermore, a Congressionally-mandated “failure to vote” tax has a decent 
chance of passing constitutional muster under the reasoning articulated in National 
Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius and New York v. United States.111 A 
tax for failing to vote in elections would raise considerable revenue for States and 
would also expand voter participation. To counter potential critics of a “failure to 
vote” tax, proponents could invoke the Court’s logic in Sebelius, and offer the 
following rebuttal: “it is abundantly clear the Constitution does not guarantee that 
individuals may avoid taxation through inactivity.”112 Alternatively, incentivizing 
voting in the form of a tax credit, pursuant to Congress’s Sixteenth Amendment 
authority, would be a much more palatable option.113 
Blockchain technology gives society a rare opportunity to rethink basic 
processes and ask provocative questions about the possibilities of meaningful 
change and innovation. As exemplified by the remarkable number of blockchain use 
cases recasting entire industries, the only indisputable question that remains is 
when—not if—blockchain technology will revolutionize voting in America.    
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